Toward an understanding of the influence of cultural background and domain experience on the effects of risk-pricing formats on risk perception by Fraser-Mackenzie, Peter et al.
1 
 
Toward an understanding of the influence of cultural background and domain 
experience on the effects of risk-pricing formats on risk perception. 
Peter Fraser-Mackenzie, Ming-Chien Sung, Johnnie E.V. Johnson* 
 
Centre for Risk Research, Southampton Management School, University of Southampton, 
Southampton, SO17 1BJ, UK 
 
*Corresponding author: Tel: +44 23 8059 2546,  jej@soton.ac.uk 
 
ABSTRACT 
Risk information framing can be a powerful tool for aiding the communication of risk and 
improving decision-making. However, little work has investigated the extent that these framing 
effects depend on the characteristics of the perceiver. In our study, we examine whether the 
effects of different risk-pricing formats on risky choices are the same for all individuals, no 
matter their domain experience or cultural background, or whether there are interactions 
between these factors. Survey 1 revealed that three risk-pricing formats of the same choice 
problem resulted in the same individuals making different risky choices (preference reversal); 
suggesting that risk-perception was distorted by the risk-pricing format manipulation. In 
Survey 2, the effects of the risk-pricing formats were shown to differ by the participants’ 
cultural background (Asian vs. European) and the extent of their domain experience. The fact 
that there were no differences between the cultural or domain experience groups in their 
overall tendency to select riskier (cf. safer) choices indicates that risk behavior differences 
between groups are often closely linked to perceptual, rather than simply attitudinal, cognitive 
processes. The results demonstrate the complex, interactive cognitive processes that are used to 
encode risk information, involving the framing of the information and the cultural background 
and previous experiences of the individual. We conclude that it is important to consider the 
characteristics of the individual (e.g., culture, domain experience, etc.) when manipulating risk-
information framing with the aim of improving their risk communication. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The presentation format of risk information (e.g., frequencies such as 1 in 5 vs. 
probabilities such as 0.20) has been shown to play an important role in the perception of risk 
magnitude.(‎ 1-‎ 5) Accordingly, the choice between different types of risk-information formats "can 
be made according to the goal of the communication of risk" (Siegrist, 2006, p. 507).(‎ 6) In 
manipulating the manner in which information is presented, it is hoped that risk 
communication will be improved and the decision-maker will better percieve risks and make 
more informed decisions. However, it is unclear from the literature whether the effects of risk-
information formats are consistent for all types of individual. For example, individuals’ risk-
taking behavior has been found to be influenced by differences in their nationality,(‎ 7,‎ 8) gender,(‎ 
9-‎ 11) genetic make-up(‎ 12) and even their criminality(‎ 13). Given these differences, can we be 
certain that framing effects are consistent across these different types of individual, and that the 
risk framing manipulations we make always influence the perception of risk in the manner 
intended? In other words, when considering the different types of risk-information formats, it 
may be necessary to consider both the "goal of the communication" as well as the 
characteristics of the perceiver. 
A potential problem is that studies examining the effects of risk-information formats 
tend to recruit participants from only one type or group of individuals. Likewise, studies 
examining the differences in risk-taking between groups of individuals tend to employ only one 
risk-information format. This dissociation into group effects and framing effects is not a 
problem if the effects of these factors on risk-taking on different types of individual are truly 
independent. However, if this is not the case, then problems may arise. For example, a specific 
risk-information format may be tested on, and found to improve, university medical students’ 
perception of medical risks. However, this may not work in a similar manner for the target lay-
person audience. Similarly, differences in risk-taking propensity between cultural groups (e.g., 
Chinese vs. Americans) observed using one risk-information format may disappear, or perhaps 
even reverse, if the information is presented differently. Such a finding might suggest that 
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differences in risk-taking propensity between cultures is driven by perceptual, rather than 
attitudinal motivators. Such findings could have wide reaching impacts, for example, on 
international business negotiation strategies.(‎ 14) 
Consider, via  a simple example using hypothetical data, the possible impacts of two risk 
formats (Probabilities and Frequencies) on the risk taking propensity of different groups 
(Asians and Europeans). The data, summarized in Figure 1a, demonstrates that the risk-
information format and the group membership play a role in risk-taking propensity, but the 
effects are independent from each other. A simple explanation for this could be that the 
probabilities format increases risk-taking by affecting the perception of risk magnitude and 
Asian individuals tend to take more risks than Europeans. This latter effect may arise because of 
differences between the culture-defined groups in terms of risk attitude (i.e., Asians are more 
"risk-seeking" in nature1). However, if the data resulted in patterns such as those displayed in 
Figures 1b-d then this would indicate that something more complex was occurring. In these 
cases, the differences between the culture-defined groups are observed to depend on the risk-
information format used and the effect of the risk-information on risk-taking depends on the 
group exposed to the frame.  
Perhaps most significantly, if we observe patterns in risky choice behavior that are 
similar to those displayed in Figures 1b-d (cf. 1a), this would suggest that there exist differences 
between individuals from the two culture-defined groups in terms of their risk perception. 
Figure 1d makes this particularly clear. Specifically, we cannot infer that Asians prefer to take 
more risks than Europeans (i.e., have more risk-seeking attitudes) because even though Asians 
take more risks under the frequency format, they take fewer risks under the probabilities 
format. Rather, in these circumstances, we could conclude that the perception of risk under 
different risk-information formats appears to depend on the cultural group – i.e., that a cultural 
difference in the encoding (i.e., perception) of risk information has occurred. Equally, we cannot 
                                                          
1
 It could also be because of systematic differences in risk perception (see Weber & Hsee, 1998) – we 
cannot know for certain simply based on the evidence shown in Figure 1a. 
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infer from Figure 1b that the probabilities format always increases risk-taking (as observed for 
Asians) because risk taking by Europeans is reduced when the probabilities format is employed 
– again suggesting that cross-cultural differences in risk-perception can occur. Indeed, if the 
pattern displayed in Figure 1c was observed, we would have difficulty arguing that there are 
differences between Asians and Europeans in terms of their risk attitude because there are no 
such differences under the probabilities format. 
[Figure 1 approx. here] 
 Our aim is to establish if risk-pricing formats act consistently on individuals' risk 
perception (i.e., independently from their group membership) or, as we suspect, whether the 
effects are dependent on group membership. In order to achieve this, we employed a repeated-
measures design involving equivalent-mean risky choices in two surveys. We developed linear-
mixed models to assess the extent to which risk information is processed independently from, 
or is informed by, the cultural background and domain experiences of the individual.  
The first survey presented the same seven risky choices (hypothetical two-horse races) 
three times to each participant using a different risk-pricing format each time (decimal returns, 
fractional odds and probabilities). Participants showed different risk-preferences associated 
with the same risky choices depending on the risk-pricing format presented. This suggests that 
the risk-pricing formats were biasing their risk perception. Further analysis suggested that this 
could have been because the different risk-pricing formats biased participants' perception of 
expected value, variance or skewness. 
In the second survey, we assessed whether these effects were different depending on 
the characteristics of the individual (i.e. Asian vs. European and high vs. low gambling 
experience). We found that the effect of the risk-pricing formats on risk-choice behavior was 
indeed dependent on the cultural background and experience of the participants, confirming 
that risk perception is a complex process involving interactions between group effects (cultural 
background and gambling experience) and task feature effects (risk-pricing formats). Given that 
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perception of risk depends on a combination of factors related to the individual as well as the 
task, we conclude that risk communications should carefully consider both the manner in which 
risk information is presented and the characteristics and experiences of the perceiver. 
 The paper proceeds as follows. In section 1.1 we review traditional and perceived risk-
attitude models and how they are used in the descriptive modeling of risky choices. In section 
1.2 we introduce the specific risk-information formats and groups we examined and summarize 
the literature examining their influence on risk-taking behavior. We describe our two surveys 
(in sections 2 and 4, respectively) and how a linear mixed modeling methodology helps us to 
test our hypotheses: the first survey is designed to examine the degree and manner in which 
individuals’ risk perception is biased by risk-pricing formats and the second survey is designed 
to assess whether or not these distortions are mediated by an individual’s cultural background 
and domain experience. We examine the significance of the results of these two surveys in 
sections 3 and 5, respectively. We discuss all the results in section 6 and examine the 
implications of our work in the conclusion. 
 
1.1 The Traditional Risk-Return Model and the Perceived Risk-Attitude Model  
 Markowitz (1959) was the first to propose the risk-return model, which defines an 
individual’s willingness W(Xi) to invest in a risky option Xi as follows:(
‎ 15) 
   ( ), ( ) ( ) ( )i i i i iW X f E X R X E X bR X       [1] 
where E (Xi) and R(Xi) are the expected value and risk (measured by the variance) of returns 
associated with option Xi. The parameter b measures an individual’s risk attitude, which 
determines how that risk is interpreted.(‎ 7,‎ 14) In particular, when b is >/< 0 the individual is risk-
averse/preferring, and the model predicts that the individual would have greater preference for 
low/high risk investments. Consequently, the willingness to invest is conceptualized as a 
tradeoff between the motives of greed (represented by the expected value) and fear 
(represented by the risk). 
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However, there are a number of limitations associated with Markowitz’s (1959) model, 
particularly with respect to the nature of R(Xi) and the interpretation of b in the risk-preference 
term, bR(Xi). For example, it has been shown that variance may not accurately represent the 
way in which individuals truly perceive risk, and variance is only valid for quadratic utility 
functions.(‎ 16) Whilst these limitations are known, an adequate measure of perceived risk has not 
yet been developed.(‎ 17) One important reason for this is that individuals differ substantially in 
how they perceive risk magnitude,(‎ 18) just as they differ in the manner in which they perceive 
other information such as visual distance,(‎ 19) sound localization,(‎ 20) body sensations(‎ 21) and 
pain.(‎ 22)  
 In an attempt to overcome the limitations of variance for capturing risk perception, 
Weber and Milliman (1997) relaxed the assumption that perceived risk should be accounted for 
by a single index for all individuals in all situations.(‎ 23) They allowed perceived-risk to vary 
between individuals by replacing the variance with a personalized measure of perceived risk 
that was based on the individual’s self-reported estimate of risk magnitude. In other words, 
Weber and Milliman (1997) did not treat perceived risk as a pre-defined index (e.g., R(Xi) = 
Var(Xi)) that was identical for each individual. Rather, the perceived-risk of individual j could be 
an independent and personal function, f, of a risk index (e.g., Rj(Xi) = f j[ Risk index(Xi)]). In fact, 
cross-gender and cross-cultural differences in risk-preferences have been shown to be 
influenced by these self-reported risk magnitudes (Rj(Xi)), rather than by differences in their 
risk-attitude coefficients (bj).(
‎ 10,‎ 14) 
Figure 2 summarizes the elements of Markowitz’s (1959) traditional risk-attitude model 
(TRAM) and Weber and Milliman’s (1997) perceived risk-attitude model (PRAM). The TRAM 
assumes that risk perception equates to an index of risk (e.g., variance) for all individuals in all 
contexts. In addition, the TRAM includes a single risk-attitude coefficient to account for any 
differences in risk-preference between individuals. The PRAM, on the other hand, allows risk 
perception to vary between individuals, contexts, and cultures, independently from the risk-
attitude coefficient. This approach accommodates the results of studies which have shown that 
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risk perception varies between individuals and can differ within individuals depending on the 
context of the choice.(‎ 10,‎ 23‎ 10) Summarizing this work, Weber and Milliman (1997) concluded 
that, while “…[perceived-risk attitude] may be a stable personality trait… the effect of situational 
variables on choice may be the result of changes in risk perception” (p. 142).(‎ 23) Therefore, we 
argue it is important to account for differences within individuals in their perception of risk as a 
result of the potential contextual bias from situation k (i.e.,  Rjk(Xi)=fjk[Risk index(Xi)], where j 
denotes the individual and Xi the option). 
The key advantage of Weber and Milliman’s (1997) PRAM is that it enables us to 
maintain the notion of human rationality, despite behavior contravening certain rational norms. 
For example, as will be explained in the next section, some superficial task-features can result in 
preference reversals in the judgment of risk information and these pose a challenge to a basic 
axiom of rationality; the notion of “invariance” or “extensionality”.(‎ 24,‎ 25) This axiom states that 
rational individuals should not change their choice preferences based on superficial changes to 
the task description.  The notion of rationality of human intention can be retained if it is 
assumed that observed preference reversals result from biases in perception rather than from 
irrational changes in intention. In other words, the individual may have an invariant and 
rational attitude towards risk, indicative of their "stable personality trait" (Weber and Milliman, 
1997, p.142). However, cognitive biases in the perception of the risks during the encoding of the 
risk information may result in the degree of risk being perceived as higher or lower (thus, 
explaining observed changes in preference).   
As a result of the foregoing discussion and following the experimental work of Weber & 
Milliman (1997), Weber & Hsee (1998) and Weber, Blais, & Betz (2002), we assume that for a 
given task, risk attitude, b, is invariant within individuals, but that it can vary between 
individuals2. This permits us to retain the fundamental assumption of human rationality by 
                                                          
2 It is important to note that risk attitudes may not be stable across different types of task and domains. For example, 
Weber, Blais & Betz (2002) reveal that an individual could be risk averse in some domains (e.g. financial decisions) 
but risk-seeking in others (e.g. health/safety, recreational, ethical, or social decisions).(‎ 10) Nevertheless, given that we 
are only investigating a single task, we can assume an invariant risk attitude. 
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assuming that preference reversals by the same individuals result from cognitive biases on risk-
perception.  
[Figure 2 about here] 
1.2 Risk-Behavior Factors (RBFs) 
 There are numerous risk-behavior factors (RBFs) that appear to influence risk-taking. 
Some factors relate more to the individual, such as their attitude to a certain type of risk, 
perhaps caused by their cultural upbringing or some personality trait or their gender. Other 
factors relate more to the situation in which the risk is being assessed, such as how that risk 
information is presented. In this study we examine three RBFs, the first is related to the 
situation in which the decision is taken, namely, risk-pricing formats (i.e., risk-information 
formats) and the other two are related to individual factors: cultural background and domain 
experience. 
 
1.2.1 Risk-Information Framing  
As discussed above, studies have demonstrated preference reversals due to superficial 
changes in the task description that distort individuals’ risk perception. For example, Slovic, 
Monahan, & MacGregor (2000) found that experienced forensic psychologists’ and psychiatrists’ 
evaluations of whether a patient should be released from hospital were affected by whether the 
risk they posed was presented in frequency or percentage formats.(‎ 3) To retain the assumption 
that these psychologists and psychiatrists acted with rational intentions, it is necessary to 
assume that the changes in their decisions were the result of distortions in their perception of 
risks rather than a result of a change in their intentions (i.e., attitudes).  
The perception of choice information is not only affected by different modes of 
presentation but also by the magnitudes involved. For example, Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee, & 
Welch (2001) observed that there is little difference in our evaluation of a 1 in 10,000 and a 1 in 
10,000,000 chance of winning the lottery.(‎ 26) Wong & Kwong (2005) also revealed that 
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individuals place a higher value on an attribute that differentiates two alternatives when it is 
framed with small numbers (e.g., sound quality of .003% vs. .01%, in which the values indicate 
the percentage of noise in signal) rather than large numbers (e.g., sound quality of 99.997% vs. 
99.99%, in which the values indicate the percentage of 1 − (noise in signal)).(‎ 27) Similarly, 
prospect theory accounts for the fact that individuals tend to over/under weight low/high 
probabilities and  to weight losses more heavily than gains(‎ 1) . Consequerntly, framing 
alternatives in terms of losses (cf. gains) can result in different risky choice behavior. A key 
feature of prospect theory is the proposal that, when faced with a choice, individuals undertake 
an editing phase in which they use heuristics (e.g. rounding) to simplify the task.(‎ 28) Such 
heuristics will differ depending on the way the values are presented. Thus, the manner in which 
information is presented significantly impacts the way in which information is perceived, 
encoded, and then acted upon.  
Weber and Milliman (1997) demonstrated a correlation between contextual factors that 
affect choices and factors that affect risk perception.(‎ 23) However, they did not show that 
accounting for individuals’ biases in risk perception can improve predictions of their risky 
choice behavior.  Consequently, we set out to test if this is the case; namely, to test Hypothesis 1: 
H1: A model to predict risky choice behavior can be improved by including parameters 
to account for biases in risk perception.  
We aim to induce these biases by presenting the same risk information to the same individuals 
but in different risk-pricing formats. 
 
1.2.2 Cultural Background and Domain Experience 
Studies have revealed that an individual’s background can play an important role in their 
judgment and decision-making. For example, Asians have been shown to be more extreme (cf. 
Westerners) in their estimates of confidence when answering general knowledge questions, i.e., 
closer to certain or chance-guess ends of the confidence rating scale.(‎ 29,‎ 30) In addition, 
differences between those from different cultures have been found in the degree of 
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disconfirmation in hypothesis testing(‎ 31) and in susceptibility to cognitive biases related to 
financial investment.(‎ 32) Recent studies have also suggested that risk behavior can be predicted 
by genetic differences.(‎ 12) Consequently, it has been argued that risk perception ought to be 
modeled as a psychological variable which is subject to possible individual and cultural 
differences.(‎ 7,‎ 14,‎ 33) This may be appropriate because the meaning and awareness of risk is 
related to social definitions and a cultural system of meaning.(‎ 34) In fact, studies have generally 
shown that Asians tend to take greater risks than Westerners. (7,‎ 35) This is often explained by the 
"cushion hypothesis",(‎ 7) which proposes that individuals are more risk seeking if they have 
greater social support. It is argued that individuals from China can rely on greater social support 
due to the collectivistic culture, compared to the more individualistic culture found in the west 
(e.g. in US) and therefore feel more comfortable taking risks. 
Studies have also suggested that cultural background may not only affect an individual's 
attitude to risk, but also the way in which they perceive risk. Indeed, using the PRAM approach 
described earlier, Weber and Hsee (1998) showed that greater risk-seeking behavior by Chinese 
(vs. American) decision makers resulted from differences in their perception of the investments’ 
risk, R(Xi), not from differences in their risk attitude parameters, b.(
‎ 14) Based on this literature, 
we might expect risks in our survey to be perceived to be lower by Asian participants and, 
therefore, for these individuals to make riskier choices.  
However, whilst the literature discussed above suggests that there may be differences 
between individuals from different cultural groups in risk perception and/or attitude, it does 
not indicate whether or not the biasing effects of risk-pricing formats should be the same 
between different cultural groups. For example, are these group differences in risk taking 
increased or decreased or perhaps eliminated under certain risk-pricing formats?  
In other research Bontempo, Bottom, & Weber (1997) compared the risk judgments 
(related to monetary lotteries) of business students and security analysts from Hong Kong and 
Taiwan with those from the USA and the Netherlands.(‎ 8) They found that the probability of loss 
and the magnitude of loss had a greater effect on perceived risk amongst the Western and Asian 
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participants, respectively. However, there was no significant difference in risk perception 
between the different domain experience groups (students versus security analysts), suggesting 
that upbringing and environment shape the risk perception more than professional training or 
expertise. This null effect of domain experience on risk perception is surprising because 
expertise has been shown to affect how information is perceived and used to make non-risky 
choice decisions. For example, experts invariably develop a more detailed mental 
representation of alternatives and their associated attribute structure.(‎ 36) Hence, experts tend to 
be better able to make use of choice attributes.(‎ 37,‎ 38) Some studies have observed differences 
between experts and lay-people in their risk judgments and some have not.(‎ 39) In those that 
found effects, there was evidence of lower estimates of risk by experts (cf. lay people).(‎ 40 -‎ 42) 
However, the extent that these differences are determined by variations in risk attitude or risk 
perception is unclear.  
The above discussion suggests that culture and/or domain experience may have some 
influence on an individual’s risk-taking behavior and we suspect that these factors may have an 
effect on risk perception and on the effect of risk-information formats on choice behavior.  To 
explore this possibility we test Hypothesis 2:   
H2: Culture and domain experience mediate the distortive effect of risk-pricing 
formats.  
If this is shown to be the case, it would add considerable weight to Weber and colleagues’ 
argument that culture and experience are involved in the perceptual processes of encoding risk 
magnitude from choice information. More importantly, it would require a sophisticated 
modeling approach in which effect of different formats on risk perception may depend on the 
individual's background and experience. 
 
2. SURVEY 1 
An important aspect of the PRAM is that it provides a means for calculating the influence 
of various RBFs that can influence risky choice, including subjective expected value, E(Xi), 
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perceived risk (perhaps as a function of R(Xi)), and perceived-risk attitude, b. In order to test 
Hypothesis 1, we designed Survey 1 to examine the effect of risk-pricing formats on individuals’ 
risky-choice preference reversal (i.e., within individual). Specifically, we consider the different 
risk-pricing formats commonly used to present risk in a gambling context and their distortive 
effect on risk perception: fractional odds (i.e., 3/1, 5/4, etc.), which are often used in bookmaker 
markets, and decimal returns (e.g., $4, $2.25, etc.), which are usually found in pari-mutuel 
markets. Participants’ risky choices, based on risk information presented using these pricing 
formats and a probability format, are compared. The probability format simply shows win 
likelihoods in a decimal form (e.g., .25, .60, etc.). This enables us to test if individuals perceive 
risks differently under these different formats and to observe the extent of any preference 
reversals. The pricing formats we compare are particularly significant because Gigerenzer & 
Hoffrage (1995, 1999) found that people behave differently when presented with frequency 
rather than objectively equivalent probability data.(‎ 2,‎ 43) In addition, Rottenstreich & Kivetz 
(2006) proposed that modes which tend to elicit a non-probabilistic mindset (such as the 
decimal returns format) usually result in individuals making judgments that are less reliant on 
risk.(‎ 44) We would therefore expect that these formats may result in participants relying less on 
risk perception. 
It should be noted that not all frequency formats improve decision-making and not all 
probability formats reduce performance.(‎ 45) It has been shown that normalized frequency 
formats, which do not easily convey the base rates, do not help elicit correct Bayesian reasoning  
and probability formats which mimic natural frequencies can elicit correct reasoning.(‎ 45) In our 
study, the fractional odds format is presented as a natural frequency between the two runners 
in each race (i.e., 5/4 vs. 4/5 for the longshot and favorite in one race). We consider this a 
natural frequency comparison because the odds show the expected number of wins for each 
horse out of the same baseline number of races (i.e. longshot expected to win 4 and favorite 5 
out of 9 races). However, when comparing odds of, for example, the longshots in two different 
races (e.g. with odds of 5/4 and 2/1), the participant would need to compare different baseline 
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numbers of races (i.e. baselines of 9 and 3 races respectively). This comparison would therefore 
be more difficult as it would not be made on the basis of natural frequencies. As such, the 
fractional odds format may help/not help comparison of runners within/between races.  
 The probabilities format, on the other hand, presents the chances of each horse on a 
scale between zero and one, simplifying between and within race comparisons. While, a simple 
probability (e.g., 0.8 vs. 0.2 for the favorite and longshot) may be encoded as a natural frequency 
by participants (e.g., chances perceived as 8 out of 10; and 2 out of 10) more complex 
probabilities (e.g., 0.9524 vs. 0.0476) may be rounded during the editing phase (see section 
1.2.1) and be less accurately perceived. When presented with the returns format, the likelihoods 
must be calculated. This calculation is cognitively effortful and may also involve rounding 
during the editing phase. As such, we expect the relative winning chances of runners to be least 
well perceived under this format. 
The current literature provides no clear indication of the cross-cultural differences that 
may occur in response to these different risk-information formats.  However, in the literature 
review section (1.2.2) we discussed the "cushion hypothesis" and how this predicts Asian 
individuals to be more risk seeking in general. Yet the evidence from Weber and Hsee (1998) 
suggests that this may stem from differences in their perception of risk, rather than differences 
in their risk attitude. On this basis, we reason that if a format does not elicit a reliance on risk 
perception (i.e. returns format) we may not observe a difference between cultures in risk taking 
behavior. Whereas, formats that do elicit reliance on risk perception (i.e. probabilities format) 
may lead to cross-cultural differences such that Asian participants are more risk seeking than 
Europeans. 
2.1 Methodology 
2.1.1 Participants and Procedure 
In total, 80 male and 62 female undergraduate student participants were recruited 
during a break in a class, with ages ranging from 19 to 41 years (M = 23.27, SD = 4.28). They 
were allowed time to read a booklet containing an introduction, consent form, simple 
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descriptions of the three risk-pricing formats, a general description of the two-horse races in 
which they would be asked to select either the favorite (F: defined as the horse with the greater 
chance of winning, but with a corresponding lower payoff to a winning bet) or the longshot (L: 
defined as the horse least likely to win, but with a corresponding higher payoff to a winning bet). 
They were also given debriefing information, describing the nature of the survey. The 
participants were then presented with seven equivalent-mean risky-choices, namely, seven 
two-horse races in which the expected value of betting on the F or the L were identical. These 
races varied from one in which the winning chance of the F was close to that of the L, to a race 
where the L was very unlikely to win (cf. the F). Each participant was asked to select one horse 
in each of the seven races presented in each of the three different risk-pricing formats (i.e., to 
place a hypothetical unit stake bet on one of the horses in each race) and to record their 
decisions in the spaces provided; thus, each participant made 21 choices (see Table 1 for 
details). Blocks of races with the same risk-pricing formats were presented together but were 
counterbalanced between the participants. Thus, a participant may, for example, receive a block 
of seven ‘probability-format’ races, followed by seven ‘odds-format’ races, and finally seven 
‘returns-format’ races. Before each group of races, a page described the subsequent risk-pricing 
format in detailed, yet simple, language so that the participants were clear about the meaning of 
the risk-pricing format (see appendix A1 for information given to participants). As a form of 
incentive, participants were instructed that each race would be simulated later that day, and the 
participant that won the most money as a result of their ‘hypothetical’ bets would be contacted 
via email for an unspecified reward (worth approximately $30). 
The order in which the three risk-pricing formats appeared was counterbalanced across 
the participants, leading to six different permutations. Furthermore, the order in which the 
races appeared within each risk-pricing format was also counterbalanced across all participants 
using a quasi-complete 7x7 Latin square. The final counterbalancing involved half the 
participants being presented with races where the F was listed above the L and the other half 
were presented with races where the L was listed above the F. This counterbalancing produced 
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84 permutations (3 (risk-pricing formats in various orders) by 7 (race order) by 2 (position of 
favorite/longshot)). 
[Table 1 about here] 
2.1.2 Design 
As indicated above, all the seven races were presented using each of the three risk-
pricing formats. In the ‘probabilities format’, a horse’s prospects were represented by its 
winning probability, P, and the participants were informed that should the horse win, then a $1 
bet would result in a payoff of  $1/P; i.e., the original $1 stake plus $(1/P)-1 profit (full details of 
the instructions given to participants are provided in Appendix A1). Participants were also 
informed that in the ‘fractional odds format’, which is the most common format employed by UK 
bookmakers, a horse’s chance is represented as a ratio, NLose/NWin, namely, the number of 
occasions the horse is likely to lose (NLose), to the number of occasions it is likely to win (NWin), if 
the race were run NLose + NWin times. Consequently, the winning probability of a horse with odds 
NLose/NWin would be NWin/(NWin+NLose). Finally, participants were informed that in the decimal 
returns format, which is widely used in pari-mutuel betting markets, a horse’s prospects is 
represented in a single number, Z, such that a winning $1 bet would result in a return of $Z (i.e., 
the original stake plus $Z-1 profit). Consequently, the winning probability for this horse would 
be 1/Z.  
The horseraces consisted of binary forced-choice, equivalent-mean, risky choices that 
required one of the two horses to be selected. The choice is between horses iC and 'iC , 
both 
choices having two possible outcomes: iC  involving a payoff of 1/ iP   (with probability iP ) and a 
payoff of 0 (with probability1 iP ), written as follows: 
]0,1;/1,[ iiii PPPC   ;     [2] 
 'iC , on the other hand, has a payoff/probability structure as follows, 
]0,);1/(1,1[' iiii PPPC      [3] 
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These horses (lotteries) have equivalent means but they differ in variance. It should be noted 
that unless Pi = .5 then there will always be a favorite and a longshot. In the event that Pi is 
greater than .5 then iC  and 'iC  are the safer (or favorite, F) and riskier (or longshot, L) options 
respectively, i.e., if, and only if, iC is the favorite, 'iC  is the longshot. Therefore, only Pi is 
needed to differentiate the riskier and the safer choice in each race. Consequently, a meaningful 
index of the difference between the horses (lotteries) is the absolute difference between the 
probabilities associated with the gain outcomes from the two lotteries iC  and 'iC ; | (1 ) |i iP P   
(referred to as the lottery probability differential, or LPD). Note that the variance of the safer 
alternative in the equivalent-mean risk-choice is given as follows: 
2 1( ) 1i
i
Var C
P
   .      [4] 
Note that 0 .5iP   for the riskier choice and 1 .5iP   for the safer choice. Thus, the variance 
for the riskier alternative in the equivalent-mean risky-choice is given as follows:  
2 1( ) 1
1
i
i
Var C
P
   

.     [5] 
The variances of each of the choices in the seven races presented to participants are displayed 
in Table 1. 
The difference between the longshot 'iC and the favorite iC in terms of variance, or 
Lottery Variance Differential (LVD) is as follows, where a high LVDi indicates a choice in which 
the longshot has considerably more variance than the favorite; 
( ) ( )i i iLVD Var C Var C       [6] 
It should be noted that an important characteristic of these choices is that they also 
differ in skewness and this difference can be captured by a Lottery Skew Differential (LSD). To 
calculate this, we denote hp as the probability of the gain outcome for a particular lottery 
(horse), h, and calculate the skewness function,  hS p , for lotteries iC and 'iC  (see appendix 
A2) as follows: 
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2
(1 )(1 2 )
( ) h hh
h
p p
S p
p
 
 ,     [7] 
The skewness of each of the choices in the seven races presented to participants is displayed in 
Table 1. We define the difference in skewness between choices, as follows: 
(1 ) ( )i i iLSD S P S P   ,     [8] 
where Pi is the probability of the favorite winning and therefore 1 iP  is the probability of the 
longshot winning. 
 A high value of LSDi indicates a choice in which the riskier choice is considerably more 
positively skewed than the safer choice. It has been shown that individuals often over-bet the 
longshot and under-bet the favorite at the racetrack (a phenomenon known as the favorite-
longshot bias) and this is perhaps explained by an attraction to positive skewness.(‎ 47) 
Consequently, while individuals may experience aversion to increasing variance associated with 
the riskier choice in higher LPDi races, they may also be attracted to the greater positive 
skewness of the risker choice.  
We define risk preference as simply the propensity to choose the riskier (L) over the 
safer (F) alternative at a given level of LPD. With this in mind, the risk preference for an 
individual may depend on the relative weighting of the negative impact of variance (assuming 
risk aversion) and positive impact of skewness (assuming positive-skewness preference) as 
LPDi increases. We cannot know beforehand what these weightings may be for each individual, 
yet it seems possible that those that tend to prefer the risker (safer) choice may place a greater 
weight on the skewness (variance) relative to the variance (skewness) attributes in that race. 
However, the nature of our equivalent-mean risky choices is such that there is a strong 
correlation (r=0.970) between variance and skewness. This prevents us, due to issues related to 
multicollinearity, from examining the relative weighting that individuals apply to variance and 
skewness when making their choices. 
 Nevertheless, our main aim is not to establish this precise weighting. Rather, we are 
interested in determining if inconsistencies arise in risk preferences, however they form, within 
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the same individual across different risk-pricing formats and what this might tell us about 
biases effects of these formats on risk perception.  Therefore, it is important to note that, unlike 
the TRAM, we do not require our participants to perceive risk in terms of variance (see Figure 
2). Rather, in our main analysis, we model each individual’s risk-preferences as a function of 
LPD, where LPD simply serves as a reasonable reference of the risk level and it should be noted 
that as LPDi increases so does LVDi and LSDi  (see Figure 3). Specifically, we use a linear mixed 
model to estimate the bias on risk perception from each risk-pricing format, while allowing for 
individual differences in risk preference across a range of races with different levels of LPDi.  
[Figure 3 approx here]   
2.2 Models 
We adapted Markowitz’s (1959) risk-return model to a probabilistic binary choice 
model, estimating the probability of selecting the riskier choice over the safer choice 
Pr( , )L FX X   as a tradeoff between alternatives (F and L), in terms of the differences in expected 
value, ( , )L FE X X , and risk, ( , )L FR X X :  
Pr( , ) { ( , )} {[ ( , )] [ ( , )]}L F L F L F L FX X f W X X f E X X b R X X      [9a] 
( , ) ( ) ( )L F L FE X X E X E X      [9b] 
R(X
L
,X
F
) = R(X
L
)-R(X
F
)      [9c] 
According to this simple modification, choices may be predicted by a standard logistic function, f, 
of the willingness (W) to choose L over F.  
2.2.1 Model 1: Traditional-Risk Attitude Model  
 For our seven lotteries (i=1,2,…,7) we can present Eq.9 as a simple linear model as 
follows;
 
Pr( , ) { }L F i iX X f bR    ,    [10] 
[LPD ]i iR  ,     [11] 
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where for choice i, the probability of selecting the riskier choice ( LX ) over the safer choice 
( FX ) is estimated by as a logistic function, f, of the difference in the subjective expected value 
constant, α, the risk attitude, b, and our risk difference index (represented by LPDi) for race iR . 
The subjective expected values can be represented by a constant because in the equivalent-
mean risky-choice designs all choices have the same expected value. However, it is clear that 
there may be individual differences in subjective expected value and in participants’ risk 
preferences. As these are likely to be correlated within individuals over the repeated choices, 
we account for this in the models’ error structures, 𝜀𝑖  , by employing a linear mixed model of the 
following form:  
1 1 2 2
1 1 2 2        
jl jl jl p pjl
j jl j jl jq qjl jl
y x x x
z z z
  
   
    
   
    [12]
 
Or in a matrix form as, 
y x z    
     
[13]
 
where y is the vector for the response variable for the lth observation by the jth participant of a 
total of m participants, β1, …, βp is the vector of fixed effects parameters, x1jl is the vector for the 
first fixed effect regressor for observation l by participant j, γj1, …, γjq, is the vector of random 
effect parameters for observation l by participant j, and z1jl is the vector for the first random 
effect regressor. In the TRAM, only one fixed factor is required beyond the vector for the 
intercept coefficient (the LPDi for choice i), as follows: 
 1,2,..., 1,2,...,7[LPD ]p ix       [14] 
1,2,...,
1,2,...,
1,2,..., 1,2,...,7
[Participant ],
[Participant LPD ]
j m
q
j m i
z

 
  
  
  
   [15] 
This model is representative of the TRAM shown in Figure 2 because, when modeling 
risk-preference, it only allows for individual differences in subjective expected value (aj= γj1 
[Participantj]) and risk attitude (bj = γj2[Participantj×LPDi]) and does not allow for the potential 
distortion of risk-preference under different risk-pricing formats, i.e., Ri is simply equal to LPDi.  
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2.2.2 Model 2: Perceived Risk-Attitude Model 
Hypothesis 1 implies that the TRAM may inadequately account for risky choices across 
the three (k=1,2,3) different risk-pricing formats, as we expect the degree of perceived risk to 
vary by risk-pricing format, possibly leading to preference reversals. Consequently, we develop 
a PRAM, which retains the random factor variables from Model 1 (Eq. 15) but for the fixed factor 
variables we introduce an interaction term between the risk-pricing format (categorical factor) 
and the risk index (i.e., Risk-Pricing Format × LPD), as follows: 
1,2,...,7
1,2,..., 1,2,3
1,2,3 1,2,...,7
[LPD ],
[Risk-Pricing Format ],
[Risk-Pricing Format LPD ]
i
p k
k i
x


 
 
 
  
 
 
.   
[16] 
This allows us to model the bias in risk-perception caused by the risk-pricing format. We 
test Hypothesis 1 by determining, via a log likelihood ratio test (LLR), if the PRAM (Eq. 16), 
better captures individuals’ risky choices than the simpler TRAM (Eq. 14).  
 
3. RESULTS 
3.1 Descriptive Statistics 
The estimated choice behavior of each individual participant (thin grey lines) and the 
PRAM’s estimation for the main effects (thick black lines) of each risk-pricing format are shown 
in Figure 4. We define risk-approach/-avoidance behavior as that where participants 
increase/decrease the proportion of risky choices as LPD increases. Consequently, the graphs in 
Figure 4 clearly show a significant degree of preference reversal arising from the different risk-
pricing formats. The odds format results in a considerable range of risk-approach and risk-
avoidance behavior amongst individuals but with an overall modest reduction in the proportion 
of riskier choices as LPD increases. The probability and returns formats elicit very different 
patterns of behavior. Most individuals reduce the number of riskier choices as LPD increases 
under the probability format and there is far less variation between individuals than under the 
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odds format. However, most individuals tended to increase their proportion of risky choices as 
LPD increases under the decimal returns format. 
 
3.2 Inferential Statistics 
The results indicate that PRAM better accounted for the risky choices of the participants 
than TRAM (ΔAIC -358.2, χ2 difference (4) = 366.2, p < .001). The variable LPDi was a significant 
factor in PRAM (F(1, 141) = 9.62, p = .002), suggesting that the proportion of riskier (vs. safer) 
choices varied with LPDi. Importantly, there was no main effect of the format (F(2, 2693) = 0.69, 
p = .499) but rather a significant Risk-Pricing Format × LPD interaction (F(2, 2693) = 34.33, p 
< .001). As hypothesized, this interaction term indicates that, having controlled for individual 
differences in risk preference, risk was perceived by individuals as a function of LPD and that 
this function differed depending on the framing of the risk-information (the risk-pricing format). 
Thus, we confirm Hypothesis 1 that the PRAM better accounts for risky choice behavior than the 
TRAM; the former model including and the latter model excluding parameters to account for 
biases in risk perception. These results suggest that to more accurately model participants’ 
choices, it is important to account for biases in risk-perception within individuals resulting from 
risk-pricing format manipulations (i.e., to use the PRAM).  
[Figure 4 about here] 
These results are confirmed by the estimated random and fixed effects parameters for 
the PRAM (Table 2). The odds and probability pricing format interactions with LPD are both 
associated with negative risk-perception coefficients that are significant, whereas the returns 
format (shown by the reference level as LPD in Table 2) has a positive coefficient that is 
significant.  
 [Table 2 about here] 
 
 
 
23 
 
4. SURVEY 2 
Survey 2 was designed to test Hypothesis 2, namely, that culture and domain experience 
mediate the distortive effect of risk-pricing formats. Specifically, we explore whether culture and 
domain experience are only associated with differences in the overall proportion of risky 
choices (i.e., irrespective of the risk-pricing manipulation) or whether, in fact, these two RBFs 
play a role in mediating the biasing effects of risk-pricing format on risk perception within 
individuals. This is achieved by determining whether, as we expect, we are better able to model 
participants’ risky choices if we allow culture and domain experience to mediate the effects of 
the risk-pricing formats on risk-perception rather than keeping the biasing effects of risk-
pricing formats separate from the culture/domain experience effects. 
 
4.1 Methodology 
4.1.1 Participants and Procedure 
The participants from Survey 1 were also recruited for Survey 2. In total, 59 (42%, males=28, 
females=31) reported themselves as being Chinese/Taiwanese nationality and 83 (58%, 
males=52, females=31) reported themselves as being European. Participants were asked the 
total length of time they had spent in the UK. This was used to determine some quantifiable 
difference in the cultural experiences of the ‘Asian’ and ‘European’ groups. The median period 
the Asian and European groups reported they had been in the UK was 1 and 19 years, 
respectively.  
We were concerned that gender differences may play a role in mediating the effect of 
pricing modes. However, tests revealed no significant difference between male and female 
participants in either risk preference or in the mediating effect of risk-pricing formats (see 
appendices A4 and A5). Furthermore, the difference in proportions of males and females in each 
group was not significant (χ2(1 ) = 2.65, p = .104). Consequently, we were confident that gender 
effects would not confound any observed cultural effects.  
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A second potential confound could have arisen had there been significant differences in 
the education or mathematical ability of the Asian and European participants. Indeed, the 
different cultural groups were likely to have been educated in different educational systems. To 
limit this effect, all participants were recruited from the same MSc course in Risk Management, 
implying that they had all passed the rigorous University admissions procedures to confirm that 
they had exceeded a given level of educational attainment. Second, we asked all participants to 
undertake a simple arithmetic test based on probability theory. The results showed no 
significant difference in this test score (t(115.86) = -0.89, p = .376) between the Asian (mean 
score = 3.16) and European (mean score = 3.45) participants.   
Participants were also asked to report their gambling experience. In particular, they 
were asked their frequency of gambling on chance games (such as the national lottery, scratch 
cards, bingo, fruit machines, slot machines, roulette, or craps) and/or skill games (e.g., sports, 
horseracing, motor-racing , greyhound racing, poker, card games, or mahjong). The frequencies 
were reported on a 6-point scale ranging from 1, indicating ‘never gamble’, to 6 indicating ‘daily 
gambling’.  
 
4.1.2 Design 
The participants were split into two groups based on their self-reported nationality: Asians 
(Chinese and Taiwanese) and Europeans (EU citizens). In addition, two groups were 
constructed on the basis of participants’ self-reported domain experience, i.e., a gambling 
experience score. Participants with below and above mean gambling experience scores (based 
on all participants) were assigned to “lower” and “higher” domain experience groups, 
respectively. Thus, the participants were separated into four groups: Asian-Higher Experience 
(AHE), Asian-Lower Experience (ALE), European-Higher Experience (EHE), and European-
Lower Experience (ELE). 
 
 
25 
 
4.2 Models 
The groupings based on cultural background and gambling experience were added as fixed-
factors to the PRAM that was analyzed in Survey 1 (i.e. Model 2 introduced in section 2.2.2). In 
order to test Hypothesis 2, we compared the extent to which the risky choices of the 
participants could be adequately accounted for by two alternative models. The first, simpler 
model, isolated the cultural background and gambling experience RBFs from the risk-pricing 
format effects (Model 3: see below). The second model allowed the two RBFs to mediate the 
effects of the risk-pricing formats (Model 4: see below). Thus, Models 3 and 4 represent, 
respectively, the idea that the biasing effect of risk-pricing formats on choice behavior is 
independent of or dependent on, the two RBFs. 
 
4.2.1 Model 3: Independence Model 
It is possible that, in terms of factors affecting their risky choices, the only difference between 
individuals in the different culture or domain experience groups is their risk-attitudes; i.e., that 
the risk-pricing formats act in a similar fashion on individuals no matter what their cultural and 
domain experiences. This would simply mean that one culture or domain experience group 
tends to take more risks, but both are equally affected by the biasing effects of the risk-pricing 
formats on risk-perception. In order to capture this possibility, we developed Model 3, which is 
identical to Model 2 except that it includes an additional three way interaction: LPD × Culture × 
Experience. Thus, as in Model 2, LPD can interact with the Risk-Pricing Format (LPD ×Risk-
Pricing Format) to capture the biasing effect of the formats on risk perception. However, this 
effect is modeled as an effect independent of the risk-preference functions for the four 
culture/gambling experience groups (modeled via the LPD × Culture × Experience interaction). 
Consequently, in Model 3 the effects of Risk-Pricing Formats are assumed to be independent of 
the group effects. As a result, the interactions in Model 3 are restricted to the following terms3: 
                                                          
3
 Only the highest level interactions are shown but all the lower order interactions and main effects are retained 
as‎indicated‎by‎“…”.‎Similarly,‎for‎eq.‎20, all the lower order interactions and main effects are retained. 
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1,2,...,7
1,2,...,
1,2,...,7 1,2,3
1,2,...,7 1,2 1,2
[LPD ],
...,
[LPD Risk-Pricing Format ],
[LPD Culture Experience ]
i
p
i k
i g m
x

 
  
 
 
 
  
 
   
.   [19]                           
 
4.2.2 Model 4 : Dependence Model 
If culture and domain experience mediate the biasing effect of the risk-pricing formats, 
we should observe a differential biasing effect of the pricing format among the four 
culture/domain experience groups. This can be captured by allowing further interactions to be 
included in the model as follows: 
1,2,...,7
1,2,...,
1,2,...,7 1,2,3 1,2
1,2,...,7 1,2,3 1,2
[LPD ],
...,
[LPD Risk-Pricing Format Culture ]
[LPD Risk-Pricing Format Experience ]
i
p
i k g
i k m
x

  
  
 
 
 
  
  
   
 
[20] 
In this model, the LPD × Risk Pricing Format interaction (modeling the biasing effect of 
the risk-pricing formats) is allowed to interact with the two culture/gambling experience RBFs. 
This allows for a differential effect of the risk-pricing formats between the four groups (AHE, 
ALE, EHE, ELE). In this case, risk-pricing formats are assumed to be dependent on the cultural 
and domain experiences of the individual. Note that in both Models 3 and 4 we continue to 
control for individual differences in risk attitudes using the random variable regressors used  in 
Models 1 and 2 (Eq. 15). 
Consequently, Model 3 assumes that the risk-pricing formats have the same biasing 
effect on all groups, but that groups may vary in their risk-attitudes. Model 4 assumes that the 
risk-pricing formats may have a differential biasing effect depending on the culture and domain 
experience of the participants. Consequently, to test Hypothesis 2, we assessed, using log-
likelihood ratio tests (LLR), whether Model 4 better accounted for participants’ risky choices 
than Model 3.  
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5. RESULTS OF SURVEY 2 
There was a significant difference between the two cultural background groups in terms of the 
mean number of years that the group members had spent in the UK (Asian: M = 1.69, SD = 1.44 
years; European: M = 15.01, SD = 10.14 years; t(1, 86.39) = 11.83, p < .001). However, there was 
no significant difference between the participants in the two culture groups in terms of their 
average gambling experience: χ2 (1, N = 142) = 0.4029, p = 0.526. In addition, there was no 
significant difference in the proportion of riskier choices selected by Asian (M=42.7%) and 
European (M=46.1%) participants over the 21 races (t(1, 135.7) = 0.942, p = 0.347) or by those 
in the higher (M=41.9%) and lower (M=47.4%) gambling experience groups (t(1, 138.4) = 1.523, 
p = 0.13). These results suggest that it is unlikely that there are any differences between the 
individuals in these groups in terms of their risk attitudes, i.e., in their general propensity to 
choose the riskier alternative.  
The degree to which models 3 and 4 accounted for the risky choices of the participants 
was compared using LLR tests. The results, displayed in Table 3, reveal that Model 3 did not 
better account for the risky choices of participants than the PRAM (Model 2). This suggests that 
the culture and domain experience of the participants did not impact on their risky choice 
behavior independently of the risk-pricing formats. Model 4, on the other hand, was 
significantly better at accounting for the risky choices of participants than Model 3. This result 
supports Hypothesis 2, indicating that culture and/or domain experience impact on the effect of 
the risk-pricing formats on risk-perception.  
[Table 3 approx here] 
ANOVA results for Model 4 are shown in Table 4. An important finding was that the LPD 
× Culture and the LPD × Experience interactions were not significant. This shows that there is 
no significant difference between the cultural or domain experience groups in terms of their 
risk preferences once we control for effects of risk-pricing formats on risk perception. In other 
words, there is no significant difference in the behavioral responses (changes in the degree of 
risk-taking) to the underlying LPD of the choices between Asians and Europeans or between 
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individuals with high and low gambling experience. Rather, the results suggest that the 
differences in risky choice behavior between individuals in the Asian and Europeans groups and 
between the high and low gambling experience groups appear to be associated with differences 
in their responses to the risk-pricing formats. 
The results displayed in Table 4 also show that the LPD × Risk Pricing Format × Culture 
interaction is significant. This suggests that the effect of the risk-pricing formats on the change 
in the proportion of risky choices (as LPD increases), is different for each culture group. In 
addition, the Risk Pricing Format × Experience interaction is significant, whereas the LPD × Risk 
Pricing Format × Experience interaction is not significant. Accordingly, we simplify Model 4 to a 
best fitting version (Model 5) by removing the latter interaction: 
 
1,2,...,7
1,2,...,
1,2,3 1,2
1,2,...,7 1,2,3 1,2
[LPD ],
...,
[Risk-Pricing Format Experience ]
[LPD Risk-Pricing Format Culture ]
i
p
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 
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   
 
[21] 
 
This model is significantly better than Model 2 in explaining the risky choices of 
participants (ΔAIC -16.9, χ2 difference (4) = 22.87, p < .001), and it is the most parsimonious 
model of how culture and domain experience mediate the effect of the risk-pricing formats. The 
parameters of Model 5 are shown in Table 5 and the main effects are shown in Figure 5(a-c). 
Under the odds pricing format the ‘high experience’ participants tended to take more risks 
overall and Asian participants showed a greater risk-averse response to an increase in the LPD. 
A different pattern emerged for the probabilities pricing format. Here Europeans were more 
risk-preferring when the LPD was low (intercept at 0.68 (high experience) and 0.74 (low 
experience) compared to 0.36 and 0.42, respectively, for Asians). However, both Asians and 
Europeans and individuals with high and low experience converged to almost zero risk-taking 
when the LPD approached one. Under the returns pricing format the pattern changes again. 
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Here the participants with greater experience tended to take more risks and both Asian and 
European participants increased their degree of risk-taking as LPD increased.  
[Tables 4 and 5 and Figure 5 about here] 
In summary, the results clearly show that the differences between the Asian and 
European groups and between the high and low experience groups are not in their overall risk-
taking or in the changes in their degree of risk-taking in response to increased LPD. Rather the 
differences between the groups are captured by differences in the way that they respond to the 
three risk-pricing formats. In other words, at least in our study, culture and domain experience 
do not appear to be associated with differences in risk-attitudes or any general propensity to 
take more or less risk. Rather, the differences appear to be related to how the individuals in the 
groups perceive, encode and then act upon risk information framed by the risk-pricing format. 
 The results were consistent with our expectations that no differences in choice behavior 
would be observed with the returns pricing format, possibly because this format does not elicit 
a probabilistic mindset. However, contrary to our expectations based on the extant literature, 
we did not observe Asian participants selecting the riskier choice more frequently than 
European participants for pricing formats in which we expected a probabilistic mindset to be 
elicited (i.e. probabilities format). In fact, the significant negative Format(Probabilities) × 
Culture(Asian) coefficient in Table 5 indicates a significantly lower proportion of longshot 
choices selected by Asian participants (compared to Europeans) under the probabilities format. 
 
6. DISCUSSION 
Our results showed that risk approach/avoidance was strongly dependent on the risk-
pricing formats used to present the choice information. As such, risk preferences appear to arise 
from complex co-dependent processes involving the individual's risk attitude in a given task and 
also the encoding of risk, which appears to be highly dependent on the way the information is 
presented. We did not reveal any difference between Asians and Europeans or between the 
higher and lower domain-experience groups in terms of their overall tendency to select riskier 
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choices (i.e., on average, across all of the risk-pricing format). Instead, we found that the 
distortive effect of the risk-pricing formats on choice behavior appeared to depend on the 
cultural background and domain experience of the participants. In particular, all groups were 
similarly risk-avoidant when presented with the probability pricing format. However, the 
fractional odds format resulted in comparatively greater risk-preference in Asians (cf. 
Europeans). In addition, the fractional odds and decimal returns formats resulted in greater risk 
preference amongst participants with greater gambling-experience.  
Based on extant literature, we expected greater risk-taking by Asian participants when 
presented with pricing formats in which a probabilistic mindset is elicited (i.e. probabilities 
format). In fact, our results showed the opposite effect. One explanation for this finding is that 
our Asian participants were making these decisions while in residence in another country 
where they may feel more isolated from their "social cushioning". Without feeling the support 
from such cushioning, these individuals may have a heightened risk aversion. Indeed, Weber, 
Hsee and Sokolowska (1998), following from the concerns expressed by McDaniels and 
Gregory's (1991), discuss the importance of considering the impact of situational factors (i.e. 
current political and economic environments) as well as cultural norms in understanding cross-
cultural differences in risk taking.(‎ 35,‎ 46) This highlights the main argument of this paper, that it is 
important to consider all the RBFs that might be involved in risky decision-making and how 
they might interact together to influence choice behavior. 
The results demonstrate the important effects of risk-pricing formats employed in 
surveys and question the extent to which we can draw conclusions, particularly regarding an 
individual's true risk attitude, on the basis of studies using only one risk-pricing format. Our 
results suggest this is particularly important when employing experimental results to infer 
broader cultural and environmental differences in risk-taking. For example, it has been found 
that risk-preferences vary depending on culture but not domain experience.(‎ 8) Our results 
demonstrate that differences between groups in risk-taking can be heavily reliant on the nature 
of the task, as even superficial changes in the presentation of risk information can result in 
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exposing or removing group differences in risk-taking. This leads us to question the extent that 
other demographic differences in risk-taking observed in the literature are truly attitudinal or 
simply the result of differences in risk perception and whether such differences may be 
removed or highlighted by assessing them under different task frames. 
Of course, there are some very important caveats related to our study. Our participants 
were students, many of whom had traveled to the UK to study, whereas the participants in 
Bontempo et al.s’ (1997) study were students who were living in their own respective coutries. 
In addition, our domain experience groups were based on self-reported measures of gambling 
experience, whereas the Bontempo et al. (1997) study used security analysts for the higher-
experience group and university students for the lower-experience group. Consequently, our 
results cannot be compared directly and we are even cautious about infering too far beyond the 
boundaries of our study. The potential for sampling bias means that we cannot conclude that 
the effects shown are representative of all Asians and Europeans or all experienced and novice 
gamblers. Rather, our conclusion is more fundamental; namely, that we should be cautious in 
concluding that broad group differences/similarities exist without controling for the task-
features used in the study (e.g., risk information frames). Whether or not the differences we 
observe are truly the result of cultural experiences and gambling experience or whether they 
arose from other differences between the groups we cannot be certain. However, we can 
conclude that the risk-taking of different groups of individuals can be differentially affected by 
superfical manipulations of task framing. Given our repeated-measures design, we can also 
conclude that such effects are closely linked to how individuals encode and percieve the risk 
information. This conclusion is reached because the effects of the risk-pricing formats were 
observed to result in preference reversals by the same individuals even when differences 
between individuals in risk attitude were controlled in the model. Therefore, in summary, our 
results support the ideas of Weber and colleagues that risk perception is an important factor in 
understanding the many possible differences between groups of individuals in risk-taking 
behavior.  
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Our use of linear mixed models allowed us to produce and plot estimations for each 
individual’s subjective expected value and risk-preference (see Figure 4). By plotting the 
individual effects, as well as the main effects, we were able to show the impact of the risk-
pricing format manipulations on each individual participant in the study. As a result, we were 
able to show that while the fixed effects are important, the random effects between individuals 
are considerable. This suggests that an exploration of further RBFs is needed to help unravel the 
causes behind the variation in subjective expected values and risk-preferences between 
individuals. 
A further benefit of our approach is that previous studies have modeled perceived-risk 
attitudes by asking participants to provide a self-reported measure of risk-magnitude (e.g., 
Weber & Hsee, 2000). This methodology relies on the validity of introspection and the idea that 
the true value of perceived-risk is accessible to the participant’s conscious mind. However, this 
notion is not in line with some of the dual-process theories of risk, which suggest that risk 
processing often involves automatic and subconscious mental processes.(‎ 26) Our approach of 
using a repeated-measures design and linear mixed modeling does not suffer from this 
limitation. Consequently, we believe that this provides a useful paradigm for undertaking 
perceived-risk attitude research. 
While not the main focus of this study, it would have been interesting to explore the 
extent to which our results could be explained by how saliently the skewness and variance 
features of each choice were perceived under the different risk-pricing formats. However, the 
nature of the equivalent-mean risky choices we employ is such that there is a strong correlation 
between variance and skewness. This prevented us from separating the effects of these two 
moments.  Future work examining to what extent individuals, when faced with different risk-
information formats, make choices which are affected by their personal characteristics (e.g., 
culture, domain experience, etc.), might employ lotteries with payoffs and probabilities 
designed such that skewness and variance are not highly correlated.(‎ 48) This would enable an 
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assessment to be made of the extent to which these different moments were perceived under 
the different risk-formats. 
We are particularly interested in the possibility of extending the perceived-risk attitude 
approach to capture different perceived-risk functions of a given risk index. We expect that this 
may involve more complex modeling than our simple linear model. Weber (2010), for example, 
suggests that combining the risk-return approach with concepts from cognitive psychology or 
psychophysics might be a useful approach to this problem.(‎ 49) Another alternative might be to 
consider mixture models and to determine whether these different perceptions of risk might be 
representative of a switching between different decision models for different tasks or where 
different models apply to different types of individual (see, Harrison & Rutström, 2009).(‎ 50) 
A potential limitation of our work is that participants may not have understood some of 
the pricing formats as well as others and this may have influenced their choices. To reduce this 
possibility we made every attempt to provide participants with clear explanations, with 
practical examples of how chances and payoffs could be calculated in each case. We also offered 
participants the opportunity to seek clarification of details of any of the pricing formats (see 
appendix A1 for details). Interestingly, at real world race tracks, sometimes fractional odds are 
employed (e.g. by UK bookmakers) and sometimes the returns format is used (in pari-mutuel 
markets) without explicit explanations being given to bettors. The fact that we find differences 
in choices based on these different pricing formats (whether derived, as we believe, from 
perceptual  biases, or through lack of understanding on the part of bettors) presents some 
interesting implications for understanding discrepancies in the degree of favorite-longshot bias 
which have been observed in bookmaker and pari-mutuel markets. This topic is beyond the 
scope of this study but offers the prospect of valuable future research. 
Our study highlights important differences in framing effects between individuals from 
different cultural backgrounds and between those with different levels of domain experience. 
However, our study did not aim to identify the cognitive mechanisms which might be behind 
these effects. Future research aimed at establishing these mechanisms might consider sampling 
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from individuals residing in the countries being analyzed(‎ 8) and our findings suggest that a large 
number of RBF’s should be included to account for as many potential confounds as possible. 
The topic of incentives in economic experiments has attracted considerable attention 
and continues to be a debated topic.(‎ 51)  It could be argued that the "unspecified", "winner-takes-
all" incentive scheme employed in our study may have promoted a maximal risk-taking strategy. 
However, our results suggest that the participants did not respond in this manner to the mild 
incentive as only 2 out of the 142 participants (1.4%) surveyed, employed the maximal risk 
strategy (i.e. choosing the longshot alternative in each race). However, to further the 
understanding of the effects of the risk-pricing manipulations, a carefully incentivized, 
experimental approach such as a random-lottery incentive system(‎ 51-‎ 54) would be desirable. 
Despite this lack of clear incentivization, we do know that participants in our study were 
not simply choosing randomly. If this were the case, it would be very unlikely that we would 
observe any systematic effects of the pricing formats. It is possible that different incentive 
structures may have impacted on the effect sizes we observe, just as time pressure could be 
expected to increase the effect sizes. Indeed, we expect that the impact of framing on risky 
choices may depend on a complex pattern of interactions between numerous factors (e.g., the 
individual’s risk preferences, domain experience, cultural norms, the presence of time pressure, 
incentives/payoff structures, stress etc.) and more research is needed to establish these 
interactions.  
 
7. CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, our results indicate that RBFs can play a complex, interactive role in risky 
decision-making. This is important because some risk-pricing formats resulted in no differences 
in risky choice behavior between groups of individuals (based on cultural background and 
experience) whereas other pricing formats resulted in large differences. Importantly, we found 
that there was no difference between groups in terms of their attitudes to risk, i.e., as defined by 
their overall propensity to be risk-seeking/avoidant, once the effect of the risk-pricing formats 
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had been controlled in the model. Rather, the differences between the groups appeared to stem 
from differences in how they encoded risk-information presented in a particular manner. 
Awareness of this is important because, as Weber & Hsee (1998, p.1216) point out, “[d]rawing 
the wrong inference from observed cultural differences in preference among a set of risky options 
(e.g., assuming that a negotiation partner from a different culture is risk-seeking when, in fact, she 
simply perceives the associated risks to be smaller) can lead to wrong predictions of her 
preferences in subsequent situations with different option sets”. (‎ 14)  
Ultimately, therefore, our study indicates that one should be cautious in assuming 
attitudinal differences between individuals when perceptual differences may better explain the 
data. In such cases, interventions aimed at tackling an individual's risk attitude may not be 
effective or may even be harmful. Rather, interventions aimed at tackling risk perception may 
be more fruitful. In particular, our study shows that those who seek to communicate 
information concerning risk must consider the target user group and its characteristics carefully. 
Risk communication that is effective for one group of individuals may not work in a similar 
fashion for others and, at worse, could even be detrimental to their decision-making.  For 
example, the design of risk communication to aid forecasting, in the form of risk-information 
dashboards, may need to be different for executives and factory workers. (‎ 55,‎ 56) Similarly, 
disease or treatment-risk information for doctors may need to differ from that designed to 
inform lay-people(‎ 57) and odds pricing at the race-track may need to be presented in different 
formats to account for groups with different levels of experience or from different cultural 
backgrounds.(‎ 58) 
Finally, we believe that the risk-return conceptualization of risk preference combined 
with equivalent-mean risky choices provides a highly controlled environment for experimental 
work exploring risk-taking. We also believe that an approach which combines this with 
repeated-measures designs and linear mixed models, as employed here, offers the prospect of 
providing us with a more vivid picture of both the main effects and the finer-grained, individual 
level effects of RBFs on risk-taking behavior.  
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Table 1 
The three price formats for each of the choices in each race and the associated 
objective payoffs and likelihoods. 
Race Choice Format 
Probs.1 
Format 
Odds 
Format 
Returns 
Variance Skewness 
1 F .5555̇ 4/5 $ 1.80 0.80 -0.16 
 L .4444̇ 5/4 $ 2.25 1.25 0.31 
2 F .6000 4/6 $ 1.67 0.67 -0.22 
L .4000 6/4 $ 2.50 1.50 0.75 
3 F .6666̇ 1/2 $ 1.50 0.50 -0.25 
L .3333̇ 2/1 $ 3.00 2.00 2.00 
4 F .6923 4/9 $ 1.44 0.44 -0.25 
L .3077 9/4 $ 3.25 2.25 2.81 
5 F .8000 1/4 $ 1.25 0.25 -0.19 
L .2000 4/1 $ 5.00 4.00 12.00 
6 F .9000 1/9 $ 1.11 0.11 -0.10 
L .1000 9/1 $10.00 9.00 72.00 
7 F .9524 1/20 $ 1.05 0.05 -0.05 
L .0476 20/1 $21.00 20.00 380.00 
1Note that the probabilities in races 4 and 7 are rounded to 4 decimal places (see Appendix A3). 
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Table 2  
Estimates for the random effects parameters (that capture individual differences in subjective 
expected value and risk attitude) and for the fixed effects (that capture the effect of risk behavior 
factors) for Model 2: perceived risk-attitude model. 
Random Effects  
(Individual Differences) 
Type Variance Standard 
Deviation 
 
Participantj Subjective EV (aj) 2.408 1.55  
 Risk Attitude (bj) 11.193 3.346  
Fixed Effects (RBFs) Estimate Std. E z value Sig. 
(Intercept) 0.105 0.195 0.537 .591 
LPD  0.831 0.403 2.061 .040 * 
Format(Odds) 0.049 0.203 0.244 .807 
Format(Probabilities) 0.247 0.213 1.161 .245 
LPD × Format(Odds)  -1.681 0.396 -4.244 < .001 *** 
LPD × Format(Probabilities)   -4.758 0.464 -10.252 < .001 *** 
*** significant at .001, ** significant at .01, * significant at .05. 
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Table 3  
A comparison of the degree to which Models 1-4 adequately explain the risky choices of participants. 
Models are ordered by increasing complexity. The degree to which each model accounts for the risky 
choices of participants is compared with the simpler model above (e.g., Model 2 vs. Model 1). Significant 
improvements in Log Likelihoods are tested using Chi-squared tests with the difference in the number of 
parameters between the models as the degrees of freedom. 
Model Model 
Df 
ΔAIC Log 
Likelihood 
Chi Sq Chi Df Sig. 
Model 1  5 -9.13 -1866.6 11.14 1 < .001 *** 
Model 2 9 -358.20 -1683.5 366.20 4 < .001*** 
Model 3 15 -6.02 -1680.5 5.98 6     .425  
Model 4 21 -13.5 -1667.7 25.53 6 < .001 *** 
*** significant at .001, ** significant at .01, * significant at .05.  
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Table 4 
ANOVA table (type 3 hypothesis definition from SAS Theory) for Model 4: Dependence 
Hypothesis Model). 
 
Numerator DF Denominator DF F value1 Sig  . 
LPD 1 139 7.92 .006 ** 
Format 2 2685 2.21 .110  
Culture 1 139 1.55 .214  
Experience 1 139 0.23 .631  
LPD×Format 2 2685 28.73 < .001 *** 
LPD×Culture 1 139 0.83 .364  
Format×Culture 2 2685 6.04 .002 ** 
LPD×Experience 1 139 0.09 .759  
Format×Experience 2 2685 5.44 .004 ** 
LPD×Format×Culture 2 2685 4.50 .011 * 
LPD×Format×Experience 2 2685 1.90 .150  
1The F statistics is calculated based on Satterthwaite's approximation for denominator 
degrees of freedom. 
*** significant at .001, ** significant at .01, * significant at .05. 
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Table 5 
Estimates for the random effects parameters that model individual differences in subjective expected 
value and risk attitude and the estimates for the fixed effects that model the risk behavior factors (RBFs) 
for Model 5: Best Fitting Model. 
Random Effects  
(Individual Differences) 
Type Variance Standard 
Deviation 
 
Participantj Subjective EV (aj) 2.47 1.57  
 Risk Attitude (bj) 11.72 3.42  
Fixed Effects (RBFs) Estimate Std. E z value Sig. 
(Intercept) -0.090 0.285 -0.319 .750 
LPD  0.808 0.538 1.501 .133 
Format(Odds) 0.033 0.286 0.144 .909 
Format(Probabilities) 1.223 0.304 3.687 < .001 *** 
Culture(Asian) 0.025 0.399 0.063 .950 
Experience(High) 0.420 0.261 1.610 .107 
LPD × Format(Odds) -1.399 0.526 -2.662 .008 ** 
LPD × Format(Probabilities) -5.747 0.634 -9.065 <.001 *** 
LPD × Culture(Asian) 0.104 0.828 0.126 .900 
Format(Odds) × Culture(Asian) -0.021 0.411 -0.050 .960 
Format(Probabilities) × Culture(Asian) -1.372 0.436 -3.145 .002 ** 
Format(Odds) × Experience(High) 0.068 0.215 0.316 .752 
Format(Probabilities) × Experience(High) -0.672 0.237 -2.833 .005 ** 
LPD × Format(Odds) × Culture(Asian) -0.702 0.806 -0.870 .384 
LPD × Format(Probabilities) × 
Culture(Asian) 
2.185 0.941 2.322 .020 * 
*** significant at .001, ** significant at .01, * significant at .05 .  
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Figure 1. (a) shows a dissociation between the group effects and the framing effects on risk-
taking propensity; (b-d) show possible interactions between group and framing effects. 
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Figure 2. The Traditional-Risk Attitude and Perceived-Risk-Attitude Models of Risk-Preference. 
In this figure, b is the risk attitude parameter and R is the perceived magnitude of the risk of 
choice Xi by individual j in the context of k (such as a particular risk-pricing format or for a 
particular cultural group). 
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Figure 3. (a) shows the monotonic relationship between the lottery skewness differential (LSDi, 
shown here as a natural log transformation, ln(LSDi), to more clearly display the relationship) 
and the lottery probability differential (LPDi ) for each choice, i. (b) shows the monotonic 
relationship between the lottery variance differential (LVDi, shown here as a natural log 
transformation, ln(LVDi)) and the lottery probability differential (LPDi ) for each choice, i. 
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Figure 4. Risky choice behavior of participants modeled according to the perceived risk-attitude model (Model 2).  
The figure shows the estimated proportion of risky (vs. safer) choices (based on the perceived risk-attitude model) for each participant (light grey 
lines) under each risk-pricing format (a-c) as LPD increases. The thick black lines in each graph indicate the fixed factor effects for participants under 
each risk-pricing format as LPD increases,  
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Figure 5. The risky choice behavior of the four cultural background/gambling experience groups (AHE, ALE, EHE and ELE) modeled using the best fit 
model (Model 5). 
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9. APPENDICES 
Appendix A1 
Introduction 
 
 Placing a bet with a bookmaker means that you are willing to stake a certain fixed 
amount of money against the bookmaker to predict the outcome of a race correctly. If your 
horse wins, then the bookmaker will give you back your stake and also an additional sum of 
money. If you are wrong then you lose your stake. The amount won depends on the likelihood 
that your horse will win. i.e., in a two horse race, the horse that is unlikely to win (the longshot) 
will offer a higher payout than the horse than it most likely to win (favorite). 
 
In this experiment you will be given a number of two horse races and you will be asked 
to decide which horse you would like to bet on. You must decide which horse you would like to 
place your (hypothetical) $1 stake on by marking the box that corresponds to your choice in 
each race (e.g., see below): 
 
   
 
 
 
 
The information indicating which horse is the favorite and which is the longshot will be 
either in probabilities, odds, or returns. The meaning of each type of information will be fully 
explained as you are given the races. 
 
 
 
Continue through the booklet reading all the information carefully. 
 
Tick Runners 
Odds 
Offered 
 Horse 1 20/1 
 Horse 2 1/20 
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Appendix A1 cont. 
Probabilities 
Please read carefully. 
Probabilities indicate the chance that a horse will win. As at least one horse will win the race, 
the two probabilities in a two horse race will always add up to one. 
 
For example 
Horse 1: 0.75 
Horse 2: 0.25 
 
Chance 
 
Horse 1 has a 0.75 probability, or a 75% chance that it will finish first. Therefore, it is the 
favorite. Horse 2 has a 0.25 probability, or a 25% chance of winning, and as such is the longshot .  
 
Winnings 
 
Under these probabilities, you would win 3 times and lose once in every four races, if you bet on 
the favorite. However, the odds on the favorite take this high winning probability into account. 
This means that if you put $1 on the favorite you would win (1/0.75)−1= 33 cents (i.e. you 
would get back $1.33 which includes your $1 stake)  
 
If you bet on the longshot you would win 1 and lose 3 in every four races. However, the odds on 
the longshot take this lower winning probability into account.  This means that if you put $1 on 
the longshot you would win (1/0.25) −1= 3 dollars back each time it won (i.e you would get 
back $4). 
 
 
 
Summary 
 
In summary, you could potentially win more by betting on the longshot. However, the more 
money you could win, the less likely the horse will win. The favorite will win more often, yet the 
returns for an individual bet will be smaller in amount. 
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Appendix A1 cont. 
Odds 
 
Please read carefully 
 
Odds indicate the total you could win if you bet a given stake. Odds tell you how much you could 
win and also provide an estimate of the chance of the horse winning. 
 
The first number suggests the amount you would win if you bet a stake equal to the second 
number. Also, the first number tells you how many times the horse is likely to lose and the 
second number tells you how often it is likely to win in a given number of races (equal to the 
sum of the first and second number). 
 
For example: 
Horse 1: 5/2 
Horse 2: 2/5 
 
Chance 
 
The larger the first number and the smaller the second, the more unlikely it is that the horse will 
win. In this case Horse 1 is likely to win 2 times, and lose 5 times, out of 7 races (5 + 2) Whereas, 
the smaller the first number and the higher the second number, the more likely it is that the 
horse will win. In this case, Horse 2 is likely to win 5 times, but lose 2 times, out of 7 races (2+5). 
 
Winnings 
 
In this case, the bookmaker believes Horse 2 to be the favorite and more likely to win. As a 
result the bookmaker offers 2/5 on the favorite and 5/2 on the longshot . 
 
This means that if you were to place a $2 stake on Horse 1 you would win $5 if the horse won 
(i.e you will be returned $5 winnings plus your original stake of $2). Whereas, the favorite 
(horse 2) is more likely to win and so you would have to place a $5 bet in order to win $2 if 
horse 2 won the race (and your original stake would also be returned).  
 
As you are only allowed to bet $1 on each race you would win $5 / 2 = $2.50 on top of your $1 
stake (i.e. you would receive back $3.50) on the longshot if it won, and $2 / 5 = 40 cents on top 
of your $1 stake (i.e. you would receive back $1.40) if you bet on the favorite and it won. 
 
Summary 
 
In summary the first number in the odds tells you how much you win if you bet a stake equal to 
the second number. The first number also tells you how often it is likely to lose and the second 
how often it is likely to win (out of a number of races  equal to the  sum of the first and second 
number in the odds). 
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Appendix A1 cont. 
Returns 
 
Please read carefully 
 
Returns indicate exactly how much you would collect from the bookmaker including the $1 
stake if your selected horse won the race. 
 
For example 
Horse 1: 3.50 
Horse 2: 1.82 
 
 
Chance 
 
In this case, Horse 1 is the longshot as you would win the most if it won. Whereas, the favorite is 
Horse 2 and you would win the least if it won. The larger the return, the less likely is it to win. 
The smaller the return, the more likely it is to win. You can determine the probabilities of the 
horses winning the race by dividing 1 by the return of the longshot, i.e. 
 
 
Probability of Horse 1 (longshot) winning = 1 / 3.50 = 0.28 
 
So, Horse 1 would win 28% of the time 
and Horse 2 would win 72% of the time (1 - 0.28  = .72) 
 
 
Winnings 
 
If you placed 1 dollar on a horse you would be given back the returns figure in dollars. So a $1 
bet on Horse 1 would return $3.50 to you if it won (this figure includes your original $1 
stake)and a $1 bet on Horse 2 would return $1.82 to you if it won ((this figure includes your 
original $1 stake). 
 
 
Summary 
 
The higher the ‘returns’ number the more you could win but the less likely it is that the horse 
will win the race. One divided by the return of the longshot indicates its probability of winning 
and 1 minus the longshot’s probability indicates the favorite’s probability of winning. The 
figures displayed tell you exactly the amount in dollars that you would receive if you bet on that 
horse and it wins. 
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Appendix A2 
A binary lottery, h, such as those examined in this paper, with payoff structure (X, q), offers the 
prospect of a payoff of 1x with probability hq  and a payoff of 0x  with probability1 hq . The 
skewness, or third moment about the mean ( 3
hM ), for this lottery is given by  
3
( )E EX X . 
This is defined as: 
     
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The equivalent-mean risky choices we examine are designed such that 0 0x  and ( ) 1E X . 
Consequently, when the probability of payoff 1x  is given by hp  (and 1x , is necessarily equal to
1/ hp ) then  
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This accords with the result given in Golec and Tamarkin (1998), who determine the skewness 
of the return of a horse, h, in a race with objective and subjective probabilities of winning as hp
and hb , respectively, and t as the track take, as follows:  
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In our races, we do not include a track take, thus the term (1- t)3 =1 can be omitted; 
3
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(1 )(1 2 )h h h
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b
 
 .     [A4] 
We also assume hp = hb as participants are informed that the odds/returns/probabilities 
provided for horse h represent its actual probability of winning the race. Consequently, we can 
simply use hp to represent the likelihood of a given horse winning the race (i.e. hp  equals iP  and 
1 iP  for alternatives (horses) iC and 'iC , respectively). Thus, for our purposes a skewness 
function, S( hp ), for horse h is simply a function of the probability of horse h winning the race, as 
follows: 
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Appendix A3  
Rounding errors in races 4 and 7 could have resulted in expected values not summing to 
precisely 1 in these races if calculated on the basis of the probabilities presented. However, 
expected values calculated using these rounded probabilities (race 4: favorite = 0.9999889, 
longshot = 1.000025; race 7: favorite = 1.00002, longshot = 0.9996) were not more predictive of 
participants choices in a mixed model than assuming expected values of 1 for these races (i.e., 
the intercept), F(1,2838)=0.83, p = .400. Therefore, we concluded that participants were not 
able to discern this edge in these choices as a result of the rounding error. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix  A4 
ANOVA table (type 3 hypothesis definition from SAS Theory) for the 
independence model of gender effects. 
 
Numerator DF Denominator DF F value1 Sig.  
 LPD 1 140 9.71 .002 ** 
Format 2 2693 0.69 .499  
Gender 1 140 0.03 .864  
LPD×Format 2 2693 34.33 <.001 *** 
LPD×Gender 1 140 0.15 .696  
*** significant at < .001, ** significant at < .01, * significant at < .05, . significant at < .1. 
56 
 
 Appendix A5 
ANOVA table (type 3 hypothesis definition from SAS Theory) for the dependence model 
of gender effects. 
 
Numerator DF Denominator DF F value1 Sig.  
 LPD 1 140 9.71 .002 ** 
Format 2 2689 0.73 .483  
Gender 1 140 0.03 .864  
LPD×Format 2 2689 34.37 <.001 *** 
LPD×Gender 1 140 0.15 .696  
Format×Gender 2 2689 0.10 .909  
LPD×Format×Gender 2 2689 0.25 .782  
1The F statistics are calculated based on Satterthwaite's approximation for denominator 
degrees of freedom. 
*** significant at .001, ** significant at .01, * significant at .05 . 
